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Vol. XVI JUNE, 1931 No. 4
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, SECTIONS 52-74,*
WITH MISSOURI ANNOTATIONSf
BY TYRRELL WILLIAMS
Section 52. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER DEFINED.
Acceptance of an offer is an expression of assent to the terms
thereof made by the offeree in a manner requested or authorized
by the offeror. If anything except a promise is requested as con-
sideration no contract exists until part of what is requested is per-
formed or tendered. If a promise is requested, no contract exists,
except as qualified by Section 63, until that promise is expressly
or impliedly given.
Comment:
a. In a unilateral contract the act requested and performed as
consideration for the contract ordinarily indicates acceptance as
well as furnishes the consideration; and, under Section 45, per-
forming or tendering part of what is requested may both indi-
cate assent and furnish consideration. In a proposal for a bi-
lateral contract the mere assent of the offeree, whether mani-
fested by words or acts, is by implication the promise requested
and therefore here also mutual assent and consideration are indi-
cated by the offeree at one and the same time.
* Copyright, 1928, The American Law Institute.
t Copyright, 1931, by Washington University. Previous sections of the
Restatement, similarly annotated, will be found in the ST. Louis LAW RE-
viEw for December, 1930, and February, 1931.
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b. A bilateral contract by definition consists of mutual prom-
ises. It is therefore essential that the offeree shall give the
promise requested by the offeror, and doing this clearly indicates
acceptance of the offer. The fact that this promise is given may
be shown by any words or acts which indicate the offeree's as-
sent to the proposed bargain.
c. As appears from Section 64 acceptance may be complete as
soon as it is started on its way.
Illustration:
1. A, an auctioneer, requests bids at an auction. B makes
the highest bid. A contract is formed, when, A by letting
the hammer fall, or by other clear indication of his purpose,
announces that a contract or sale has been made.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. Sawyer v.
Walker (1907) 204 Mo. 133, 102 S. W. 544, an offer to share
commissions in the sale of property accepted by acting upon it
and obtaining purchasers; Williams v. Emerson Brantingham
Implement Co. (Mo. App. 1917) 198 S. W. 425, shipping ma-
chinery by offeree to offeree's agent held not acceptance of offer
to buy machinery; Nicholas v. Acme Cement Plaster Co. (1909)
145 Mo. App. 523, 122 S. W. 773, offer to pay for replastering
building accepted by conduct known to offeror. The cases just
cited illustrate the first sentence of the Section. The second
sentence is illustrated by Trustees of LaGrange College v. Parker
(1918) 198 Mo. App. 372, 200 S. W. 663, offer to pay money to
charitable institution held not accepted because there was no
performance in reliance on offer. The third sentence is illus-
trated by American Pub. & Engr. Co. v. Walker (1901) 87 Mo.
App. 503, a bilateral contract with a promise by offeree to per-
form services as requested by offeror who promised to pay
money.
Section 53. NECESSITY FOR KNOWLEDGE OF OFFER.
The whole consideration requested by an offer must be given
after the offeree knows of the offer.
Comment:
a. Consideration is defined in Section 75. In Section 53 no
reference is made to the technical requirements of the sufficiency
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of consideration; it is only stated that in order to constitute ac-
ceptance, whatever the offeror requests must be given.
Illustrations:
1. A offers a reward for information leading to the arrest
and conviction of a criminal. B, in ignorance of the offer,
gives information leading to his arrest and later, with
knowledge of the offer and intent to accept it, gives other in-
formation necessary for conviction. There is no contract.
2. A offers $500 to anyone who will give him a particular
set of first editions. B, a friend of A, in ignorance of the
offer, makes A a Christmas present of all but one of the
books. Later, on learning of the offer, he tenders the re-
maining volume and demands $500. He is not entitled to it.
Annotation:
This Section is not in accord with Missouri law. In Hoggard
v. Dickerson (1914) 180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S. W. 1135, the court
said: "It is sufficient if any essential part of the service is per-
formed after the party claiming it had knowledge of the reward
being offered and relied on the same being paid." This is dictum
in a reward case, but seems to be accurately based upon a hold-
ing in Smith v. Vernon County (1905) 188 Mo. 501, 87 S. W.
949, also a reward case, where "the bare arrest was prior to the
offer but was consummated by a delivery after the offer," the
reward having been offered for the "apprehension and convic-
tion" of a certain criminal.
It should be remembered that Section 23 is in accord with
Missouri law.
Section 54. WHO MAY ACCEPT AN OFFER.
A revocable offer can be accepted only by or for the benefit of
the person to whom it is made.
Comment:
a. The words "for the benefit of" are inserted to cover such
contracts as are permitted by Section 75 (2), namely those in
which the offeror's promise to B is conditional on an act being
done or a promise made by C in exchange for the offeror's prom-
ise. C's act or promise is an acceptance.
b. An offer may also be accepted by an agent of the offeree,
and even if one who accepts, purporting to be such an agent is
not authorized by the offeree so to do, his act may be ratified;
but throughout the restatement of this subject it is assumed, in
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-the absence of contrary statement, that any necessary act may
be done by an agent.
Illustrations:
1. A makes an offer to B, who dies after receiving it.
His executor, though acting within the period stated in the
offer, cannot accept it.
2. A sends an order for goods to B, B hands the offer over
to C who fills the order without disclosing to A that the per-
formance does not come from B. There is no contract.
3. A, in Illustration 2, before using the goods, discovers
that they have come from C. A's retention or use of them
is an acceptance of an offer from C, and a contract arises.
Annotation:
This Section has nothing to do with irrevocable options (Sec-
tions 46, 47), or with contracts for the benefit of third persons
(Sections 133-147).
The Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law. No cases
exactly in point have been found.
Section 55. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAL CON-
TRACT; NECESSITY OF INTENT TO ACCEPT.
If an act or forbearance is requested by the offeror as the con-
sideration for a unilateral contract, the act or forbearance must be
given with the intent of accepting the offer.
Comment:
a. When an offeror requests a certain act or forbearance as
the consideration for his promise, the act or forbearance when
furnished is an ambiguous expression of intent, since acts, like
words, often have more than one objective meaning. The rea-
sonable interpretation may be that the offeree accepts the pro-
posal, but it is possible that the true interpretation is that the
offeree as a free man has exercised his privilege of acting or
forbearing in the manner requested, without accepting the pro-
posal. The only way to determine what his conduct actually
means even objectively, is to ascertain his intent.
b. This is not the same as saying that the offer must be the
cause of the acceptance. The offer is, indeed, usually the sole
cause of the acceptance; but frequently there are other causative
factors, and occasionally contracts may exist where if the offer
is in any sense a cause of the acceptor's action it is so slight a
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factor that a statement that the acceptance is caused by the
offer is misleading.
c. Except to the extent stated in Sections 71 and 72, no ques-
tion of intent to accept by words or acts apparently indicating
assent arises when a bilateral contract is proposed. If, in ac-
cordance with Section 20, an offeree does acts with intent to do
them which indicate his assent to an offer of a bilateral contract
communicated to him as required by Section 23, the offeree comes
under a duty to the offeror; and as he is bound by the contract, he
is also entitled to take advantage of it. Indeed, this is neces-
sary consequence of the axiom that both parties to a bilateral
contract must be bound or neither is bound. Whereas when a
unilateral contract is proposed and the offeree does the act re-
quested, he may do it either to make a gift or a bargain.
Illustrations:
1. A offers a reward for information leading to the con-
viction of a criminal. B gives the information under cir-
cumstances compelling the conclusion that he did not intend
thereby to secure the reward but was so completely actuated
by motives of fear or public duty as to preclude such an in-
tention. There is no contract.
2. B, the facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1,
induced by motives of fear or public duty, would have given
the information without hope of reward, but as there is an
offer of reward he intends when he gives the information to
accept the offer. There is a contract.
3. A communicates an offer to B requesting a return
promise. B makes that promise intentionally. There is a
contract, whatever B's state of mind may be.
4. A communicates an offet to B, who accepts it, being in-
duced or caused to do so solely by C's fraudulent misrepre-
sentations of which A is ignorant. There is a contract.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Ralls County
v. Stephens (1904) 104 Mo. App. 115, 78 S. W. 291, three parties
claimed a reward offered for the capture of a murderer; the
court decided in favor of one claimant because "he alone of the
parties, when he learned of the murder and the reward for its
perpetrator, became active and enterprising in endeavoring to
effect a capture." An offer of guaranty is not turned into a
contract by an act performed two years and eight months after-
wards, and without notice to offeror. Peninsular Stove Com-
pany v. Adams Hardware Co. (1902) 93 Mo. App. 237. See also
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Allen v. Chouteau (1890) 102 Mo. 309, 14 S. W. 869, taxes held
to be paid on faith of offeror's letter, though claimed otherwise;
Sanderson v. Lane (1890) 43 Mo. App. 158, offered reward claim-
ed but not allowed when claimant had no knowledge of offer.
Section 56. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAL CON-
TRACT; NECESSITY OF NOTICE TO OFFEROR.
Where forbearance or an act other than a promise is the con-
sideration for a promise, no notification that the act or forbear-
ance has been given is necessary to complete the contract. But
if the offeror has no adequate means of ascertaining with rea-
sonable promptness and certainty that the act or forbearance has
been given, and the offeree should know this, the contract is dis-
charged unless within a reasonable time after performance of the
act or forbearance, the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to
notify the offeror thereof.
Comment:
a. In the formation of a unilateral contract where the offeror
is the party making the promise, as is almost invariably the case,
a compliance with the request in the offer fulfills the double func-
tion of a manifestation of acceptance and of giving considera-
tion. It is only in the exceptional case where the offeror has no
convenient means of ascertaining whether the requested act has
been done that notice is requisite. Even then, it is not the notice
which creates the contract, but lack of notice which ends the
duty.
Illustrations:
1. A writes to B: 'Let C have $100 and I guarantee its
repayment." Immediately on receiving this communication,
B lets C have $100 but fails to notify A of the fact, although
he knows that A is not otherwise likely to learn of it. B
cannot enforce the guaranty if C fails to pay the debt.
2. B, the facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1,
an hour after advancing the money receives a letter from
A revoking the offer of guaranty. B promptly thereafter
notifies A of the advance. The guaranty is binding. The
contract is formed by the advance of the money, and notice
being sent by B in a reasonable time the contract is not
discharged.
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Annotation:
By its terms this Section applies only to unilateral contracts.
If a promissory offer contemplates a return promise, the situa-
tion is governed by Section 52.
The first sentence of Section 56 is in accord with the holdings
in Allen v. Chouteau (1890) 102 Mo. 309, 14 S. W. 869, where
the payment of taxes was the acceptance of an offer, the court
saying "full performance of the consideration of an offer, before
the offer is withdrawn, constitutes an acceptance of the offer";
Carter v. Western Tie & Timber Co. (1914) 184 Mo. App. 523,
170 S. W. 445, sawing of timber; Leesley Bros. v. Fruit Co.
(1912) 162 Mo. App. 195, 144 S. W. 138, reduction of a draft.
In the case last cited, the court said: "There is a radical distinc-
tion in regard to communication of acceptance between offers
which ask that the offeree shall do something and offers which
ask that the offeree shall promise something. In offers of the
former kind, communication of the acceptance is ordinarily not
required; in offers of the latter kind, communication of the ac-
ceptance is always essential." The cases just mentioned in-
volved ordinary unilateral contracts, other than guaranty con-
tracts.
Guaranty Cases. Section 56 as a whole is evidently intended
as a rule of decision in guaranty cases. When compared with
Missouri decisions in guaranty cases the entire Section is not
inconsistent with Missouri law, although some Missouri dicta
seem to imply that notice is required as a general rule, but is
dispensed with in exceptional cases. Pearsell Mfg. Co. v. Jet-freys (1904) 183 Mo. 386, 81 S. W. 901; Central Savings Bank v.
Shine (1871) 48 Mo. 456; Nelson Mfg. Co. v. Shreve (1902) 94
Mo. App. 518, 68 S. W. 376. In the case last cited the court said:
"Occasionally the facts show the minds of guarantor and guar-
antee met without a formal notice of acceptance of the proposal
by the guarantee, and also that the guarantor knew his proposal
had been acted on and he had thereby become responsible; as
when his promise was simultaneous with the grant of credit.
Whenever it is apparent the guarantor had full knowledge of
those facts without actual notice from the guarantee, such
notice is not essential to render the former liable. One of such
exceptions and the one with which we are at present concerned,
is where the guaranty is given in response to a request for it by
the creditor. In such instances the answer of the guarantor
agreeing to become responsible for the money to be loaned or
merchandise sold on credit to another party, at once concludes
the contract and proves the guarantor knew he had assumed
responsibility." Some Missouri dicta do not distinguish sharply,
as the Restatement does, between bilateral and unilateral con-
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tracts of guaranty. Mitchell & Bro. v. Railton (1891) 45 Mo.
App. 273. No Missouri case has been found which justifies the
Restatement's theory that a failure to exercise diligence to notify
the offeror, in cases where notice is required, operates as a con-
dition subsequent to discharge the contract. No Missouri case
has been found where due diligence to notify was followed by an
actual failure to notify.
In the following cases it was held that the facts indicated lia-
bility against the guarantor without express notification from
the guarantee: Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Jones (1875) 61
Mo. 409; Barker v. Scudder (1874) 56 Mo. 272; American Nat.
Bank v. Pillman (1913) 176 Mo. App. 430, 158 S. W. 433. In
the following cases it was held that under the facts, no liability
would exist unless notice was given: Taylor v. Shouse (1881)
73 Mo. 361; Central Savings Bank v. Shine (1871) 48 Mo. 456;
Rankin & Rankin v. Childs (1846) 9 Mo. 673. Actual knowledge
may take the place of intended notice. Tolman Co. v. Means
(1893) 52 Mo. App. 385.
The leading federal case pertinent to this Section is Davis Sew-
ing Machine Co. v. Richards (1885) 115 U. S. 524, 29 L. ed. 480,
cited with approval in John Deere Plow Co. v. McCullough
(1903) 102 Mo. App. 458, 76 S. W. 716.
Section 57. UNMATERAL CONTRACT WHERE PROPOSED ACT IS
TO BE DONE BY OFFEROR.
If in an offer of a unilateral contract the proposed act or for-
bearance is that of the offeror, the contract is not complete until
the offeree makes the promise requested.
Comment:
a. This Section covers a particular and rather peculiar case
covered by the more general language of Section 52. It occurs
only where the performance of the offer automatically occurs at
the moment the promise requested is given. This may happen
where the proposal relates to the transfer of personal property.
The very act of the acceptor in promising to pay the price may,
if the offer so specifies, transfer the ownership of the goods to
the offeree.
Illustration:
1. A writes to B, who Is boarding A's horse, "I should like
to sell my horse to you, and if you will promise to pay $200
for it, the horse is yours." B makes the requested promise.
Ownership of the horse is thereupon instantly transferred
to him.
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Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. Blow v. Spear
(1869) 43 Mo. 496, delivery of tobacco and promise to pay for
same. See also Botkin v. McIntyre (1884) 81 Mo. 557, exchange
of hay, the offeree's promise being implied.
Section 58. ACCEPTANCE MUST BE UNEQUIVOCAL.
Acceptance must be unequivocal in order to create a contract.
Comment:
a. An offeror is entitled to know in clear terms whether the
offeree accepts his proposal. It is not enough that the words of
a reply justify a probable inference of assent.
Illustrations:
1. A sends an order for goods to B. B replies that the
order will receive his attention. There is no contract.
2. A writes to B offering to sell a piece of land. B re-
plies, "I shall meet you with the money in a few days and be
ready to arrange particulars." There is no contract.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "The acceptance
to close a contract on an offer must be absolute, unambiguous,
unequivocal, without condition or reservation, and in exact ac-
cordance with the offer. It must not vary from the offer either
by way of omission, addition or alteration. If it does, neither
party is bound." Scott v. Davis (1897) 141 Mo. 213, 42 S. W.
714. To the same effect: Krohn-Fechheimer Co. v. Palmer
(1920) 282 Mo. 82, 221 S. W. 353; Remmers v. Bromschwig (Mo.
App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 115; Baker Matthews Lumber Co. v.
Leach (Mo. App. 1923) 255 S. W. 955; Arnold v. Cason (1902)
95 Mo. App. 426, 69 S. W. 34.
Section 59. ACCEPTANCE MUST COMPLY WITH TERMS OF OFFER.
Except as this rule is qualified by Sections 45, 63, 72, an ac-
ceptance must comply exactly with the requirements of the of-
fer, omitting nothing from the promise or performance requested.
Comment:
a. This rule is a necessary corollary of the basic idea of con-
tracts that duties are imposed by the law for only such per-
formance as the parties have expressed a willingness to assume.
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Illustrations:
1. A publishes an offer of reward for the "apprehension
and conviction" of a criminal. B gives information leading
to his apprehension and C later gives information necessary
for his conviction. Neither B nor C is entitled to the re-
ward. Nor are they entitled to it jointly unless they acted
jointly.
2. A offers B $5 for a book. B promptly communicates
to A a promise to give the book. There is no contract, since
A requested the actual delivery of the book, not a mere
promise to give it.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. Scott ,v. Ameri-
can Express Company (Mo. App. 1921) 233 S. W. 492, where a
reward was offered for the conviction of an alleged criminal and
the court held that within the meaning of the offer there could be
no conviction pending an appeal from a judgment of conviction
in the lower court; Lovejoy v. Railroad Co. (1893) 53 Mo. App.
386, where a reward was offered for the apprehension and con-
viction of a criminal and the court held that the giving of in-
formation leading to arrest and conviction was not an acceptance
of the offer. But see Smith v. Vernon County (1905) 188 Mo.
501, 87 S. W. 949, suggesting a liberal application of the doctrine
of substantial performance to reward cases.
Section 60. PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE WHICH ADDS QUALIFI-
CATIONS.
A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds
qualifications or requires performance of conditions, is not an
acceptance but is a counter-offer.
Comment:
a. A qualified or conditional acceptance is a counter-offer, since
such an acceptance is a statement of what the person making it
is willing to do in exchange for what the original offeror pro-
posed to give. A counter-offer is a rejection of the original
offer (see Section 38 and Comment thereon). An acceptance,
however, is not inoperative as such merely because it is expressly
conditional, if the requirement of the condition would be implied
from the offer, though not expressed therein.
Illustrations:
1. A makes an offer to B, and B in terms accepts but adds,
"Prompt acknowledgment must be made of receipt of this
letter." There is no contract, but a counter-offer.
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2. A makes a written offer to B to sell him Blackacre. B
replies, "I accept your offer if you can convey me a gooC
title." There is a contract.
Annotation:
See Annotation to Section 38 as to the effect of a counter-
offer. Section 60 is in accord with Missouri law. "The ac-
ceptance of the proposition presented by the one must be accepted
by the other in the form tendered; and if the acceptance omits,
adds to, or alters the terms of the proposition made, then neither
party to the negotiations is bound." State ex rel. v. Robertson
(Mo. 1917) 191 S. W. 989, application for life insurance met by
what was held to be a counter-offer. To the same effect: Scott
v. Davis (1897) 141 Mo. 213, 42 S. W. 714 alleged contract for
sale of land; Eads v. City of Carondelet (1867) 42 Mo. 113, al-
leged contract with a municipality; Lumber Co. v. Leach (Mo.
App. 1923) 255 S. W. 955, alleged contract for sale of lumber;
White Oak Coal Co. v. Squier Co. (Mo. App. 1920) 219 S. W.
693, alleged contract to sell 100 cars of coal; Railroad Co. v.
Joseph & Bros. Co. (1912) 169 Mo. App. 174, 152 S. W. 394,
alleged contract for sale of steel rails; Sarran v. Richards (1910)
151 Mo. App. 656, 132 S. W. 285, alleged contract for sale of
land; Denton v. Mclnnis (1900) 85 Mo. App. 542, alleged con-
tract for sale of corn. In the following cases the principle of
the Section was recognized but held not to apply under the facts:
Vantrees v. Trimble (1923) 214 Mo. App. 30, 251 S. W. 396;
LysIe Milling Co. v. Sharp (Mo. App. 1918) 207 S. W. 72; Mc-
Lean v. Gymnasium Assn. (1895) 64 Mo. App. 55.
Section 61. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER WHICH STATES PLACE,
TIME OR MANNER OF ACCEPTANCE.
If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of acceptance
its terms in this respect must be complied with in order to create
a contract. If an offer merely suggests a permitted place, time or
manner of acceptance, another method of acceptance is not
precluded.
Comment:
a. If the offeror prescribes the only way in which his offer
must be accepted, an acceptance in any other way is a counter-
offer. But frequently in regard to the details of methods of ac-
ceptance, the offeror's language, if fairly interpreted, amounts
merely to a statement of a satisfactory method of acceptance,
without positive requirement that this method shall be followed.
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Illustrations:
1. A writes an offer to B in which A says, "I must receive
your acceptance by return mail." An acceptance sent by
any other means which reaches A as soon as a letter sent by
return mail would normally arrive, creates a contract.
2. A makes an offer to B and adds, "Send your office boy
around with an answer to this by twelve o'clock." The
offeree comes himself before twelve o'clock and accepts.
There is a contract.
3. A offers to sell his land to B on certain terms, also say-
ing: "You must accept this, if at all, in person at my office
at ten o'clock tomorrow." B's power is strictly limited to
one method of acceptance.
4. A offers to sell his land to B on certain terms, also say-
ing: "You may accept by leaving word at my house." This
indicates one operative mode of acceptance; but B's power
is not limited to that mode alone. A personal notice to A
would serve just as well.
5. A makes an offer to B and adds, "My address is 53
State Street." This is a business address. B sends an ac-
ceptance to A's house which A receives promptly. There is
probably a contract, but it is a question of interpretation
whether A has made a positive requirement of the place
where the acceptance must be sent.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. In Hollman v.
Conlon (1898) 143 Mo. 369, 45 S. W. 275, an equitable suit for
specific performance, time for acceptance prescribed in the offer
was held to be of the essence. Eagle Mill Co. v. Caven (1898)
76 Mo. App. 458, an action at law, differentiates clearly between
the function of the court in construing words in an offer limiting
the time for acceptance, and the function of the jury in de-
termining the time when acceptance was attempted. Other
cases in accord are: Brewer v. Lepman (1908) 127 Mo. App.
693, 106 S. W. 1107; James & Sons v. Marion Fruit Jar & Bottle
Co. (1897) 69 Mo. App. 207.
Section 62. ACCEPTANCE WHICH REQUESTS CHANGE OF TERJfS.
An acceptance which requests a change or addition to the
terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance
is made to depend on an assent to the changed or added terms.
Illustration:
1. A offers to sell B 100 tons of steel at a certain price.
B replies, "I accept your offer. I hope that if you can ar-
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range to deliver the steel in weekly instalments of 25 tons
you will do so." There is a contract, but A is not bound to
deliver in instalments.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. The principle
was applied in Stotesburg v. Massengale (1883) 13 Mo. App.
221, where there was a valid acceptance coupled with a sugges-
tion of a guaranty. To the same effect: Vantrees v. Trimble
(1923) 214 Mo. App. 30, 251 S. W. 396, acceptance with a
reference to a future contract in writing; Cavender v. Wadding-
ham (1878) 5 Mo. App. 457, acceptance with a condition already
implied by law.
Section 63. EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE BY OFFEREE WHERE OF-
FER REQUESTS PROMISE.
If an offer requests a promise from the offeree, and the offeree
without making the promise actually does or tenders what he
was requested to promise to do, there is a contract, subject to the
provisions of Section 56, provided that such performance is com-
pleted or tendered within the time allowable for accepting by
making a promise. A tender in such a case operates as a promise
to render complete performance.
Comment:
a. This section states an exception to Sections 52 and 59. If
within the time allowed for accepting the offer full performance
has been given, the offeror has received something better than
he asked for and is bound, since the only object of requiring a
promise is ultimately to obtain performance of it. Beginning to
perform within the time allowed for accepting the offer will not
amount to an acceptance, unless the offeree also gives an assur-
ance that performance will be completed.
Illustration:
1. A writes to B, "I will pay you $100 for plowing Flod-
den field, if you will promise me by next Monday to finish
the work before the following Saturday." B makes no
promise but completes the requested plowing before the fol-
lowing Monday and promptly notifies A that he has done
the work. There is a unilateral contract. There would be
no contract had B finished the plowing on Tuesday, having
made no promise.
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Annotation:
In so far as this Section sanctions a contract (not merely a
quasi-contract) when the offeree substitutes performance for a
promise to perform, without notice to the offeror, it is apparently
in conflict with the following statement of Missouri law laid
down in Conklin v. Cabanne (1881) 9 Mo. App. 579: "Where one
writes to another requiring an answer as to whether the latter
will accept certain employment at a certain sum, a voluntary
compliance with the terms, without the writer's knowledge, will
not amount to an acceptance by the latter where the letter re-
mains unanswered."
Section 64. How ACCEPTANCE MAY BE TRANSMITTED; TIME
WHEN IT TAKES EFFECT.
An acceptance may be transmitted by any means which the of-
feror has authorized the offeree to use and, if so transmitted, is
operative and completes the contract as soon as put out of the
offeree's possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches
the offeror.
Illustrations:
1. A makes B an offer by mail adding, "Telegraph your
answer." B promptly telegraphs an acceptance. The tele-
gram never reaches A. There is a contract as soon as the
telegram is delivered to the telegraph company.
2. A makes B an offer by mail, or messenger, and B
promptly sends an acceptance by his own servant or special
messenger. There is no contract until the acceptance is de-
livered by the servant or messenger to the offeror, or to some
person authorized to receive it on his behalf.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "The doctrine
now is that the contract is complete when the acceptance is for-
warded, without reference to the time of its reception." Lung-
strass v. German Insurance Company (1871) 48 Mo. 201. The
principle of the Section was the rule of decision in Logan v. Wad-
dle (Mo. App. 1922) 238 S. W. 516, where the letter of acceptance
was missing. The principle is recognized in the following cases:
Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1899) 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W.
356; Egger v. Nesbitt (1894) 122 Mo. 667, 27 S. W. 385; Trip-
pin v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1916) 194 Mo. App. 30,
185 S. W. 539; kIauck Clo. Co. v. Sharpe (1900) 83 Mo. App.
385; Lancaster v. Elliott (1887) 28 Mo. App. 86.
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Section 65. ACCEPTANCE BY TELEPHONE.
Acceptance given by telephone is governed by the principles
applicable to oral acceptances where the parties are in the presence
of each other.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. The principle
was a rule of decision in St. Louis Maple & Oak Flooring Co. v.
Knost (1910) 148 Mo. App. 563, 128 S. W. 532, where no ques-
tion was raised "as to the identity of the parties conversing."
Section 66. WHEN A PARTICULAR MEANS OF TRANSMISSION IS
AUTHORIZED.
An acceptance is authorized to be sent by the means used by
the offeror or customary in similar transactions at the time when
and the place where the offer is received, unless the terms of the
offer or surrounding circumstances known to the offeree other-
wise indicate.
Illustration:
1. A makes B an offer by mail. B promptly mails an ac-
ceptance. There is a contract as soon as B's letter is mailed.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "Notice is not
the only evidence of acceptance. Any appropriate act which ac-
cepts the terms as they were intended to be accepted, so as to
bind the acceptor, just as clearly evidences the concurrence of
the parties-the bringing their minds together-as a formal let-
ter of acceptance. The terms, 'the nature of the offer, or circum-
stances under which it is made,' or relation of the parties, may
indicate another mode; and if so, its adoption equally binds
them." Lungstrass v. German Ins. Co. (1871) 48 Mo. 201. See
also Pearsell Mfg. Co. v. Jeffreys (1904) 183 Mo. 386, 81 S. W.
901, a guaranty case where offeree's acceptance was notified to
offerors' agent. The leading federal case in accord with this
Section is Eliason v. Henshaw (1819) 17 U. S. 225, 4 L. ed. 556.
Section 67. ACCEPTANCE BY MAIL OR FROM A DISTANCE, WHEN
VALID UPON DESPATCH.
An acceptance sent by mail or otherwise from a distance is not
operative when despatched, unless it is properly addressed and
any other precaution taken which is ordinarily observed to insure
safe transmission of similar messages.
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Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "An acceptance
of an order for goods is effectual from the moment the letter of
acceptance, properly directed and stamped, is deposited in the
post office, or if by wire, the moment the telegram is paid for
and delivered to the telegraph company for transmission."
Price v. Atkinson (1906) 117 Mo. App. 52, 94 S. W. 816. The
principle is recognized by well considered dicta in the following
cases: Egger v. Nesbitt (1894) 122 Mo. 667, 27 S. W. 385;
Lungstrass tv. German Ins. Co. (1871) 48 Mo. 201; Collins v.
Hoover (1920) 205 Mo. App. 93, 218 S. W. 940; McCaskey Regis-
ter Co. v. Redd (1910) 145 Mo. App. 185, 130 S. W. 109.
Section 68. WHEN AN ACCEPTANCE INOPERATIVE WHEN DES-
PATCHED IS OPERATIVE UPON RECEIPT BY OFFEROR.
An acceptance inoperative when despatched only because the
offeree uses means of transmission which he was not authorized
to use is operative when received, if received by the offeror with-
in the time within which an acceptance sent in an authorized
manner would probably have been received by him.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law. No cases
directly in point have been found. The principle seems to be
recognized in Collins v. Hoover (1920) 205 Mo. App. 93, 218
S. W. 940, where the court said: "Plaintiffs had to prove that
they accepted defendant's offer to permit them to sell his farm,
and they undertook to make this proof by showing that they had
accepted by letter, and to do this in the absence of proof that
defendant received the letter plaintiffs were required to prove
that the letter was written and properly mailed."
Section 69. WHAT CONSTITUTES RECEIPT OF REVOCATION, RE-
JECTION, OR ACCEPTANCE.
A written revocation, rejection or acceptance is received when
the writing comes into the possession of the person addressed, or
of some person authorized by him to receive it for him, or is de-
posited in some place which he has authorized as the place for
this or similar communications to be deposited for him.
Comment:
a. Under Section 41, a revocation when sent from a distance
must be received in order to be effectual. Under Section 64 ac-
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ceptance from a distance need not be received if started on its
way in a method authorized, unless receipt is made a condition of
the offer. This, however, may be the case; and though there is
no such condition, an acceptance sent by an unauthorized method
may, under Section 68, create a contract when received by the
offeror. What amounts to receipt in all these cases is defined
by the present Section, under which a written communication
may be received though it is not read or though it does not even
reach the hands of the person to whom it is addressed.
Illustrations:
1. A sends B by mail an offer dated from A's house and
states as a condition of the offer that an acceptance must be
received within three days. B mails an acceptance which
reaches A's house and is delivered to a servant or is de-
posited in a mail box at the door within three days; but A
has been called away from home and does not personally re-
ceive the letter for a week. There is a contract.
2. A sends B by mail an offer, but later, desiring to re-
voke the offer, telegraphs B to that effect. The messenger
boy carrying the telegram from the receiving office meets
C, B's neighbor, who volunteers to carry the telegram to B,
and accordingly is given it by the messenger boy. C for-
gets to deliver it to B until the following morning. An ac-
ceptance by B mailed prior to this time creates a valid con-
tract.
Annotation:
This Section seems to be in accord with Missouri law. "A
revocation of an order does not take effect until the letter or
telegram revoking the offer is actually received." Price v. Atkin-
son (1906) 117 Mo. App. 52, 94 S. W. 816. To the same effect:
Outeault Advertising Co. v. Wilson (1915) 186 Mo. App. 492,
172 S. W. 394. For cases justifying the last clause of this Sec-
tion, see Annotation under Section 64.
Section 70. AN OFFEROR OR ACCEPTOR OF A WRITTEN OFFER
Is BOUND BY ITS TERMS.
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who mani-
fests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should rea-
sonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound
by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or
of its proper interpretation.
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Comment:
a. The effect of fraud and mistake as ground for avoiding a
contract induced thereby is stated in a later portion of the Re-
statement of this Subject. When mistake prevents the existence
of a contract is stated in Section 71.
Illustrations:
1. A, supposing a document presented to him by B is a
receipt, signs it. It is in fact a promise to pay a sum for
which B has previously offered to settle a claim. B acts in
good faith and makes no misrepresentation. There is a
contract unless A is guilty of no negligence in supposing the
document to be a receipt (see Section 71).
2. A, a carrier, receiving a shipment of goods delivers to
B, the shipper, a bill of lading. The terms of the bill of lad-
ing, unless they are opposed to public policy, form part of
the contract between A and B.
3. A orders goods from B and B ships the goods with a
label plainly reading, "No warranty of kind or quality is
given by the seller." A accepts the goods. The sale is with-
out a warranty, though apart from the notice a warranty
would be implied.
4. A makes B an offer on a sheet of paper having on the
letterhead plainly printed, "All our contracts are subject
to strikes." B accepts the offer. The statement on the let-
terhead is operative.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "To permit a
party when sued on a written contract to admit that he signed it
but did not read it or know its stipulations, would absolutely de-
stroy the value of all contracts and negotiable instruments."
Crim v. Crim (1901) 162 Mo. 544, 63 S. W. 489. See also Drys-
sen v. Union Electric Light & Power Co. (1927) 317 Mo. 221,
295 S. W. 116, release signed without reading; Donnelly v. Mis-
souri-Lincoln Trust Co. (1912) 239 Mo. 370, 144 S. W. 388, sub-
scription contract for bonds signed without reading provision as
to payee; Porter v. Woods (1897) 138 Mo. 539, 39 S. W. 794,
declaration of trust on conditions accepted by beneficiary with-
out reading; Zeilman v. Central Mut. Ins. Assn. (Mo. App. 1929)
22 S. W. (2d) 88, release of claim on life insurance policy by
beneficiary alleged to be illiterate; England v. Houser (1914)
178 Mo. App. 70, 163 S. W. 890, written contract and alleged oral
promise that it would not be enforced; International Text-Book
Co. v. Anderson (1913) 179 Mo. App. 631, 162 S. W. 641, prin-
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ciple applied to a foreigner who signed contract and then claimed
he did not understand English; Campbell v. Van Houten (1891)
44 Mo. App. 231, written contract to sell potatoes and alleged
mistake as to place of delivery; Haddaway 'v. Post (1889) 35 Mo.
App. 278, printed interpretations referred to on face of writ-
ten contract held to be part of contract.
The principle of this Section frequently has been applied to
carriers' special contracts. Railway Company v. Cleary (1883)
77 Mo. 634; O'Bryan v. Kinney (1881) 74 Mo. 125; Snider v.
Adams Express Co. (1876) 63 Mo. 376; Aiken v. Wabash R. R.
Co. (1899) 80 Mo. App. 8; Wyrick v. Railway Co. (1898) 74 Mo.
App. 406.
In several of the cases cited above, the principle of this Sec-
tion is coupled with a warning that the principle is inoperative
in the presence of fraud or mistake. And see State ex rel. v.
Bland (Mo. 1929) 23 S. W. (2d) 1029, fraud in inducing illiter-
ate foreigner to sign contract with an attorney; Reddick v. Union
Electric Light & Power Co. (1922) 210 Mo. App. 260, 243 S. W.
382, substantial evidence of fraud in procuring a release.
Section 71. UNDISCLOSED UNDERSTANDING OF OFFEROR OR OF-
FEREE, WHEN MATERIAL.
Except as stated in Sections 55 and 70, the undisclosed under-
standing of either party of the meaning of his own words and
other acts, or of the other party's words and other acts, is ma-
terial in the formation of contracts in the following cases and in
no others:
(a) If the manifestations of intention of either party are un-
certain or ambiguous, and he has no reason to know that they
may bear a different meaning to the other party from that which
he himself attaches to them, his manifestations are operative in
the formation of a contract only in the event that the other party
attaches to them the same meaning;
(b) If both parties know or have reason to know that the
manifestations of one of them are uncertain or ambiguous and
the parties attach different meanings to the manifestations, this
difference prevents the uncertain or ambiguous manifestations
from being operative as an offer or an acceptance;
(c) If either party knows that the other does not intend what
his words or other acts express, this knowledge prevents such
words or other acts from being operative as an offer or an ac-
ceptance.
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Comment:
a. The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the
formation of a contract. If the words or acts of one of the
parties have but one reasonable meaning, his intention is ma-
terial only in the exceptional case, stated in Clause (c), that an
unreasonable meaning which he attaches to his manifestations
is known to the other party. If the words or other acts of the
parties have more than one reasonable meaning, it must be de-
termined which of the possible meanings is to be taken. If
either party has reason to know that the other will give the
words or acts only one of these meanings and in fact the words
or acts are so understood, the party conscious of the ambiguity
is bound in accordance with that understanding. On the other
hand, if a party has no reason to suppose that there is ambiguity,
he may assert that his words or other acts bear the meaning that
he.intended, that being one of their legitimate meanings, and he
will not be bound by a different meaning attached to them by the
other party.
Illustrations:
1. A offers B to sell goods shipped from Bombay ex
steamer "Peerless." B expresses assent to the proposition.
There are, however, two steamers of the name "Peerless."
It may be supposed, (1) that A knows, or has reason to
know this fact, and that B neither knows nor has reason to
know it; (2) conversely, that B knows or has reason to know
it and that A does not; (3) that both know or have reason
to know of the ambiguity; or (4) that neither of them knows
or has reason to know it at the time when the communica-
tions between them took place. In the case first supposed
there is a contract for the goods from the steamer which B
has in mind. In the second case there is a contract for the
goods from the steamer which A has in mind. In the third
and fourth cases there is no contract unless A and B in fact
intend the same steamer. In that event there is a contract
for goods from that steamer.
2. A says to B, "I offer to sell you my horse for $100."
B, knowing that A intends to offer to sell his cow, not his
horse for that price, and that the use of the word "horse"
is a slip of the tongue, replies, "I accept." There is no con-
tract for the sale of either the horse or the cow.
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Annotation:
This Section treats of such mistake as prevents the formation
of a contract. Mistake and fraud as grounds for avoiding a
contract are not within the purview of the Section.
Section 71 is not inconsistent with the law of Missouri but
judicial statements of Missouri law do not always differentiate
between mistake which prevents the formation of a contract, and
mistake or fraud which may avoid a contract. In McCormack v.
Lynch (1897) 69 Mo. App. 524, the court, in holding a contract
valid in spite of a mistake on one side, said: "The defendant
could have avoided a recovery if his alleged mistake had been in-
duced by some concealment or misrepresentation on the part of
the plaintiff. Some authorities hold that he would be released
even if the plaintiff was conscious of the fact that he was labor-
ing under the mistake." In Haubelt v. Rea & Page Mill Co.
(1899) 77 Mo. App. 672, there was a mistake in the terms of an
offer unknown to offeree who accepted; held a contract.
Clause (a) seems to be in harmony with Embry v. Hargadine,
McKittrick D. G. Co. (1907) 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S. W. 777,
where the court held there was a contract; the words of the ac-
ceptance were reasonably understood by the offeror in a sense
different from the sense unreasonably attached to those words
by the acceptor.
Clause (b) presents a principle in harmony with the decision
in Wilbur Stock Food Co. v. Bridges (1911) 160 Mo. App. 122,
141 S. W. 714, although the court based its decision upon "mis-
representations" contained in a written offer which "was inten-
tionally drawn to convey a false impression" with reference to
offeror's "secret intention."
Clause (c) is in accord with Buckberg v. Washburn-Crosby Co.
(1906) 115 Mo. App. 701, 92 S. W. 733, where an alleged ac-
ceptor must have known the price quoted in an offer was an
error, the court saying: "That a binding contract cannot arise
under such circumstances is too plain for argument." See also
Dameron v. Jamison (1877) 4 Mo. App. 299, an equitable suit to
correct a deed; relief granted. On the other hand, Price Broker-
age Co. v. Railroad Co. (Mo. App. 1917) 199 S. W. 732 seems to
be a case for applying the principle, but was decided without any
reference to the knowledge of offeree as to offeror's mistake. See
also Cunningham v. Atterbury (1912) 166 Mo. App. 137, 148
S. W. 176, wherein some dicta are at variance with this clause.
Section 72. ACCEPTANCE BY SILENCE.
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to a offer, his silence and
inaction operate as an acceptance in the following cases and in no
others:
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(a) Where the offeree with reasonable opportunity to reject
offered services takes the benefit of them under circumstances
which would indicate to a reasonable man that they were offered
with the expectation of compensation;
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to
understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction,
and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept
the offer;
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, the
offeree has given the offeror reason to understand that the silence
or inaction is intended by the offeree as a manifestation of assent,
and the offeror does so understand;
(2) Where the offeree exercises dominion over chattels which
are offered to him, such exercise of dominion in the absence of
other circumstances showing a contrary intention is an accept-
ance. If other circumstances indicate that the exercise of do-
minion is tortious the offeror may at his option treat it as an
acceptance, though the offeree manifests an intention not to
accept.
Illustration of Subsection (1a):
1. A gives several lessons on the violin to B's child, in-
tending to give the child a course of twenty lessons, and to
charge B the price. B never requested A to give this in-
struction but silently allows the lessons to be continued to
their end, having good reason to know A's intention. B is
bound to pay the price of the course.
Illustrations of Subsection (1b):
2. A offers to sell to B a horse already in B's possession
for $250, saying: "I am so sure that you will accept that
you need not trouble to write me. Your silence alone will
operate as acceptance." B makes no reply, but he does not
intend to accept. There is no contract.
3. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 2,
B replies by return mail, saying: "I accept your offer."
The horse belongs to B and B owes A $250.
4. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 2, B
makes no reply and remains inactive with the intention of
thereby expressing his acceptance. The horse belongs to B
and B owes A $250.
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Illustration of Subsection (i c) :
5. A, through salesmen, has frequently solicited orders
for goods from B, the orders to be subject to A's personal
approval. In every case A has shipped the goods ordered
within a week and without notice to B. A's salesman solic-
its and receives another order from B. A receives the order
and remains silent. B relies on the order and forbears to
buy elsewhere for a week. A is bound to fill the order.
Illustrations of Subsection (2):
6. A sends B a one-volume edition of Shakespeare with a
letter, saying, "If you wish to buy this book send me $6.50
within one week after receipt hereof, otherwise notify me
and I will forward postage for return." B examines the
book and without replying makes a gift of it to his wife.
B owes A $6.50.
7. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 6, B
examines the book and without replying carefully lays it on
a shelf to await A's messenger. There is no contract.
8. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 6, B
examines the book and uses it or gives it to his wife, writing
A at the same time that he has taken the book, but that it
is worth only $5 and that he will pay no more. A may at his
option treat B as a tort-feasor or as contracting to pay $6.50.
Annotation:
This Section is in general accord with Missouri law.
Subsection (la). In the following cases it was held that serv-
ices might be contractual in the absence of a promise to pay for
them except as implied from silence: Lillard v. Wilson (1903)
178 Mo. 145, 77 S. W. 74, services rendered by daughter-in-law
of offeree, jury to decide question of contract or gratuity; Hay V.
Walker (1877) 65 Mo. 17, in accord with Restatement as to
objective test of circumstances indicating expectation of compen-
sation; Kerr v. Cusenbary (1895) 60 Mo. App. 558, slightly at
variance with preceding case and with Restatement in setting up
the subjective test of actual intention of offeror to charge for
services. In Callahan v. Riggins (1891) 43 Mo. App. 130, cir-
cumstances of domestic relation justified a verdict that the
services rendered were not contractual.
Subsection (1b). In Botkin v. McIntyre (1884) 81 Mo. 557,
defendant proposed to exchange stacks of hay and plaintiff re-
mained silent; plaintiff recovered. See also Bovard v. Mergen-
thaler Linotype Co. (Mo. App. 1919) 209 S. W. 965, where the
principle seems to be recognized but is held to be inapplicable
because of facts.
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Subsection (ic) is illustrated by Bicking v. Stevens (1897) 69
Mo. App. 168, where there was a retention for twenty days of a
note offered in payment of goods, the parties having had deal-
ings with one another before. The principle of this subsection
is at the basis of many decisions as to the validity of an account
offered as an account stated followed by a failure to object. "If
the account be sent to the debtor in a letter, which is received
but not replied to in a reasonable time, the acquiescence of the
party is taken as an admission that the account is truly stated."
Powell v. Pacific Railroad (1877) 65 Mo. 658. To the same ef-
fect: Locke v. Woodman (Mo. App. 1920) 216 S. W. 1006;
Alexander v. Scott (1910) 150 Mo. App. 213, 129 S. W. 991;
Kenneth In v. Co. v. National Bank of Republic (1902) 96 Mo.
App. 125, 70 S. W. 173. See also Brown v. Kimmel (1878) 67
Mo. 430.
The first sentence of Subsection (2) is illustrated by the widely
cited case of Austin v. Burge (1911) 156 Mo. App. 286, 137 S. W.
618, where the defendant continued to take a newspaper from
the post office after the expiration of his subscription, and was
held to have contracted to pay for the newspaper, the court say-
ing: "This was an acceptance and use of the property, and there
being no pretense that a gratuity was intended, an obligation
arose to pay for it." See also Kendall Boot & Shoe Co. v. Bain
(1891) 46 Mo. App. 581.
Section 73. EFFECT OF RECEIPT BY OFFEROR OF A LATE OR
OTHERWISE DEFECTIVE ACCEPTANCE.
An offeror who receives an acceptance which is too late or
which is otherwise defective, cannot at his election regard it as
valid. The late or defective acceptance is a counter-offer which
must in turn be accepted by the original offeror in order to create
a contract.
Comment:
a. How such a counter-offer as is referred to in the last sen-
tence of the section may be accepted depends on the general
principles which govern acceptance. In some cases Subsections
(b) or (c) of Section 72 (1) may be applicable.
Annotation:
This Section is not inconsistent with Missouri law. No cases
directly in point have been found. In McLean v. Pastime Gym-
nasium Assn. (1895) 64 Mo. App. 55, a controversy was settled
by holding that a written offer was accepted orally in spite of
subsequent and uncompleted negotiations for a substituted con-
tract.
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Section 74. TIME WHEN AND PLACE WHERE A CONTRACT IS
MADE.
A contract is made at the time when the last act necessary for
its formation is done, and at the place where that final act is done.
Annotation:
This Section is in accord with Missouri law. "Where a con-
tract is made between two parties not residing in the same juris-
diction, the situs of the making of the contract is the place where
the final assent is given by one party to the terms proposed by
the other." Peak v. International Harvester Co. (1916) 194 Mo.
App. 128, 186 S. W. 574. To the same effect: Illinois Fuel Co.
v. Railway Co. (1928) 319 Mo. 899, 8 S. W. (2d) 834, quoting
from RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent.) as follows: "A
contract is made in the state where the last act toward the com-
pletion of the contract is done by a party to the contract, or by
an agent who makes a contract for a principal"; Liebing v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1918) 276 Mo. 118, 207 S. W. 230, loan
contract on life insurance policy, application accepted in New
York; Town of Canton v. McDaniel (1905) 188 Mo. 207, 86 S. W.
1092, sale of goods to be paid for on delivery is contract at place
of delivery; Cravens v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1899) 148 Mo. 583,
50 S. W. 519, place for delivery of life insurance policy held to
be place of making contract; Crohn v. Order of United Commer-
cial Travelers (1913) 170 Mo. App. 273, 156 S. W. 472, semble.
It should be remembered that the place of making a contract
does not necessarily determine the venue of a cause of action for
a breach of that contract. Barnett, Haynes & Barnett v. Build-
ing Co. (1909) 137 Mo. App. 636, 119 S. W. 471.
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